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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Third District Court properly award Respondent/Appellee his

attorneys' fees on the second appeal given the applicable law and the finding that
Respondent/Appellee clearly prevailed on appeal?
Standard of Review. The standard of review as to an interpretation of a
Court's decision on appeal is a question of law. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). A correction of error
standard applies. Allen v. Utah Department of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah
1993).
4

2.

Does the mandate doctrine apply to circumstances in which

application of the doctrine is clearly erroneous?
Standard of Review. The standard of review as to an interpretation of a
Court's decision on appeal is a question of law. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). A correction of error
standard applies. Allen v. Utah Department of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah
1993).
3.

If the Third District Court erred in awarding Respondent/Appellee his

attorneys' fees, was this error harmless error?
Standard of Review. The standard of review as to an interpretation of a
Court's decision on appeal is a question of law. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). A correction of error
standard applies. Allen v. Utah Department of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah
1993).
4.

Is Respondent/Appellee entitled to his attorneys' fees in connection

with this appeal?
Standard of Review. The standard of review as to an interpretation of a
Court's decision on appeal is a question of law. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). A correction of error
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standard applies. Allen v. Utah Department of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah
1993).
Issue Preserved in the Trial Court. One of the two issues on remand was
attorneys' fees. This issue of attorneys' fees on appeal is also raised in this Brief
of Appellant.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2)
(2) In any action to enforce an order of
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony,
or division of property in a domestic case,
the court may award costs and attorney fees
upon determining that the party substantially
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The
court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds
the party is impecunious or enters in the
record the reason for not awarding fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the third appeal in this case. Appellant (hereinafter "Anderson")
claims that the Third District Court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to the
Appellee (hereinafter "Thompson") for fees incurred by Thompson in the second
appeal. Thompson responds that the Third District Court ruled correctly on the
remand in awarding Thompson his attorneys' fees on the second appeal.
Alternatively, Thompson submits that the mandate doctrine is not applied
inflexibly giving the Third District Court the ability to award Thompson his
6

attorneys' fees on appeal. Thompson also submits that even if an error occurred,
any error was harmless error. Thompson, as the prevailing party on the second
appeal, was entitled to his attorneys' fees on appeal. Thompson requests that the
Third District Court award of his attorneys' fees should be affirmed and that the
case should be remanded to the Third District Court for an award of his attorneys'
fees on this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Third District Court entered an Order from Hearing Held April 16, 2007
on June 15, 2007. (R. @ 398-400). This Court reversed the Third District Court
Order from Hearing held April 16, 2007.
This Court remanded the case to the Third District Court for a determination
as to whether a basis existed for an award of $455.08 to Anderson and "to
determine if an award of costs and attorneys' fees should be awarded the husband
(Thompson) and, if so, to determine the amount." (R. Pg. 536 and Appellant
Addendum 3). Opinion reported at 2008 UT App. 170.
Disposition in Third District Court. The Affidavit of Bruce L. Richards
setting forth the attorneys' fees related to trial court proceedings based on
Anderson's Order to Show Cause dated February 22, 2007 and the Appeal from
the Order from Hearing Held April 16, 2007 (the Second Appeal) was filed
January 12, 2009 (R. Pgs. 572-589). The Third District Court held an evidentiary
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hearing on February 9, 2009. Following the February 9, 2009 evidentiary hearing,
the Third District Court entered a Minute Entry on March 20, 2009 (R. Pgs. 723727 and Appellee Addendum 1).
Oral argument was subsequently held on Anderson's objections to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Regarding Fees and Costs on
Remand on June 17, 2009. The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (R. 816-820 and Appellant Addendum 1) and Order Regarding Fees and
Costs on Remand (R. 821-822 and Appellant Addendum 2). The basis for
Thompson's attorneys' fee claim is Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2). The District
Court ruled Thompson clearly prevailed on the second appeal. (R. @ 829).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent/Appellee Glen Thompson submits that the Third District Court
correctly awarded him his attorney's fees on the second appeal. This Court's
instructions on remand are not limited to trial court fees. Thompson met all
requirements for an award of attorneys' fees on appeal.
The mandate doctrine does not apply to circumstances in which application
of the mandate doctrine is erroneous. The mandate doctrine is not applied
inflexibly. The Third District Court correctly awarded Thompson his attorneys'
fees on appeal. To do otherwise would be erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice.
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If the Third District Court erred in awarding Thompson his attorneys' fees
on appeal, any error was harmless. If a specific remand instruction should have
been given, the ultimate result is the same. Thompson was entitled to his
attorneys' fees on appeal.
Thompson is also entitled to his attorneys' fees on this appeal. This appeal
should be remanded to the Third District Court for this award of fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE COURT
OF APPEALS REMAND BY
CONSIDERING ATTORNEYS' FEES
BOTH AT THE TRIAL COURT AND
APPELLATE COURT LEVEL.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to determine if an award of costs
and attorneys' fees should be made to Thompson and, if so, to determine the
amount. The determination of whether an award of costs and attorneys' fees
should be made involved making a finding as to whether Thompson was the
prevailing party. The Third District Court found Thompson clearly prevailed on
appeal in the Minute Entry entered March 20, 2009 (R. @ 725 and Appellee
Addendum 1). This finding is also made in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law entered September 24, 2009 (R. Par. 17 @ 818).
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The instructions on remand are not limited to trial court fees. The
instructions are to determine if an award of attorneys' fees should be made and to
determine the amount. Thompson met all of the requirements for an award of
attorneys' fees on appeal.
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provides a statutory basis for the award of
attorneys' fees. This statute as relied on by this Court in remanding the case states:
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2), provides that,
"in any action to enforce an order of
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony,
or division of property in a domestic case,
the Court may award costs and attorneys
fees upon determining that the parties
substantially prevailed upon the claim or
defense." Accordingly, we remand to the
District Court to determine if an award of
costs and attorneys fees should be awarded
the husband and, if so, to determine the
amount.
2008 Ut. App. 170 @ 10.
The standard for awarding attorneys' fees on appeal is whether a party is
entitled to attorneys' fees in the trial court. In Oliekan v. Oliekan, 147 P.3d 464,
471, 562 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Ut. App. 2006), this Court stated the law applicable
to attorneys' fees on appeal as follows:
.. .In divorce actions, we will generally
award attorneys fees on appeal to the
prevailing party if the trial court awarded
attorneys fees and the receiving party
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prevails on the main issues on appeal...
(Citations omitted.)
In Oliekan, the Court determined that the wife had not prevailed on appeal
and was not entitled to attorneys' fees. However, in this appeal, the case was
remanded to the District Court to determine if under the standards of Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-3(2) Respondent was entitled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees.
The standard to be applied was whether the Respondent substantially prevailed
upon the claim or defense. The Third District Court (in Finding of Fact 17 and
Conclusions of Law 4 that are not subject to Anderson's appeal) found that
Thompson clearly prevailed on the appeal and was entitled to attorneys' fees. (R.
@ 817-818 and Appellant's Addendum 1). These attorneys' fees include those on
appeal.
Attorneys' fees on appeal were requested by Thompson. Thompson in the
second appeal requests attorneys' fees in the Appellant's Brief (Appellee's
Addendum 2) and in the Reply Brief (Appellee's Addendum 3). Issue 4 in the
Statement of Issues is "Did the District Court err in not awarding Respondent his
attorneys' fees?" (Appellee's Addendum 2 Pg. 6). Point VII of the Appellant's
Brief in the second appeal not only addresses denial of Anderson's fees, it also
request Thompson's attorneys' fees. As to fees on appeal, the Appellant's Brief
states, "Respondent is also entitled to his attorneys' fees and costs of appeal."
(Appellee's Addendum 2 Pgs. 26-28).
11

In Point V of the Appellant's Reply Brief in the second appeal, the basis for
attorneys' fees is analyzed. In the Conclusion, Thompson states: "This case should
be remanded for an award of the Appellant's attorneys' fees including fees on
appeal." (Appellee's Addendum 3 Pg. 11).
Thompson met all the requirements to recover his attorneys' fees on appeal.
The remand instructions should be read to require a determination of the amount
for attorneys' fees for Thompson at both the trial court and appellate court levels.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ON REMAND
HAD AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS THE
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AT
THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE
COURT LEVEL.
As set forth in Point I, Thompson was entitled to attorneys' fees at the trial
court and appellate court levels as the prevailing party in the trial court and as the
prevailing party in the second appeal. Anderson relies upon Cache County v.
Beus, 128 P.3d 63, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 72 (Ut. App. 2005) as support that
attorneys' fees can be awarded only when specifically remanded. Anderson's
reliance upon Beus is in error based upon the facts and circumstances of the Beus
case as well as the holding. Beus was before the Court of Appeals on two
occasions.
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In the first appeal reported at 978 P.2d 1043, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Ut.
App. 1998), the Court concluded that Beus (not Cache County) substantially
prevailed on appeal. Beus was awarded his reasonable attorneys' fees incurred on
appeal. Following the remand in the first appeal and in contradiction to the award
of fees to Beus, the trial court awarded Cache County all of its attorneys' fees
including fees on appeal. This Court reversed this award of fees to Cache County
on two bases. First, the contract pursuant to which attorneys' fees were
recoverable provided that costs and fees were recoverable for successful
vindication of contractual rights. The trial court's award of attorneys' fees and
costs to Cache County from the inception of the case failed to consider only fees
and costs attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights. Second,
the Court reversed the trial court as to attorneys' fees on the first appeal because
the first appeal decision had not awarded Cache County fees but had awarded Beus
attorneys' fees. The Court did not allow the trial court to make an inconsistent
determination of fees.
Anderson incorrectly analyzes Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 926, 929
(Ut. App. 1995). Anderson asserts that this case stands for the proposition that the
trial court cannot consider attorneys' fees on appeal except as specifically
authorized to do so. However, in the first Slattery appeal, the trial court had ruled
that each party would bear its own attorneys' fees. Slattery made its first request
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for attorneys' fees at the Court of Appeals based on an employment contract. The
Court refused to address the claim for attorneys' fees. The Court stated:
Slattery also seeks attorneys' fees on appeal,
based on the employment contract.
However, she was not awarded attorneys'
fees at the trial and did not appeal from that
determination. Because Slattery does not
present any argument to support her request
for fees on appeal, we decline to address the
issue.
857 P.2d 243 at 249.
The Slattery decision found the trial court exceeded its authority on remand
because the Court of Appeals awarded no attorneys' fees. The finding of the trial
court that each party would bear their own costs and attorneys' fees was not
appealed. A separate effort to claim attorneys' fees on appeal even though not
allowed at the trial court level was not addressed by the Court of Appeals. The
trial court's subsequent award of attorneys' fees was inconsistent with the original
trial court decision that had not been appealed, the Court of Appeals' refusal to
allow attorneys' fees on appeal when first raised at the Court of Appeals level and
the Court of Appeals remand.
Other cases cited by Anderson also are different from the current situation
and are not controlling. Anderson cites a footnote from TS 1 Partnership v. Allred,
877 P.2d 156, 239 Ut. Adv. Rep. 51 (Ut. App. 1991) for the proposition that it is
not within the province of a trial court to award attorneys' fees on appeal from that
14

court. An award of attorneys' fees on appeal is the prerogative of the appellate
court. TS 1 Partnership involved an improper certification of a final order pursuant
to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court found both
parties should pay their own costs related to the improper certification and appeal
of the original summary judgment that was not a final order. The Court footnoted
that an award of attorneys' fees on appeal is the prerogative of the appellate court.
The basis for not awarding attorneys' fees related to the nature of the proceeding
and the outcome, not to entitlement to attorneys' fees on appeal.
In Yorke Management v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 546 N.E.2d 342, 344 (1989),
the Massachusetts Court addressed a Massachusetts procedure different from that
applicable in Utah respecting the determination of attorneys' fees on appeal. The
Massachusetts Court acknowledged that a basis for attorneys' fees existed under
Massachusetts law. The Court stated: "the right to appellate attorneys' fees under
the statutes is beyond dispute." The language of the Yorke Management case
about authorization from an appellate court to a trial judge related to the procedure
wherein the Massachusetts appellate court addressed the amount and
appropriateness of attorneys' fee claims rather than remanding this determination
to the trial court. The Massachusetts Court did not change its existing procedure
retaining for the appellate court the responsibility for determination of the
attorneys' fees on appeal

15

In Vinton Eppson Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, 638 P.2d 1070
(New Mexico 1981), the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed a request to
remand the case for an assessment of appellate attorney fees and decided against
remanding for that purpose. Consequently, on the subsequent appeal, the Supreme
Court ruled the District Court had exceeded the mandate of the Supreme Court of
New Mexico by awarding appellate attorneys' fees.
In Schere v. Z.F. Inc., 578 So.2d 729 (Fl. 3d DCA 1991), the Court
addressed two separate requests for attorneys' fees on appeal. One of two
plaintiffs proceeded to obtain a final judgment of foreclosure. This judgment was
affirmed on appeal with a motion for attorneys' fees being denied. See Tobin v.
Compte, 553 So.2d 1180 (Fl. 3d DCA 1989). The plaintiff subsequently filed a
motion for attorneys' fees in the trial court. The trial court granted the motion but
denied the request for attorneys' fees incurred at trial and fees for defending a
judgment on appeal and costs. These additional motions that included the request
for attorneys' fees on appeal were denied. The Florida appellate court reversed the
denial of the motion for trial fees and costs.
The second creditor filed a foreclosure action. The holder of a third
mortgage was a defendant who moved to dismiss the action. A motion to dismiss
was denied. The defendant creditor appealed with the appeal being affirmed. See
Tobin v. Schere, 546 So.2d 796 (Fl. 3d DCA 1989). The appeals court denied a
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motion for attorneys' fees. The case was then voluntarily dismissed with prejudice
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sought costs and attorneys' fees for services
before the trial court and for defending the appeal. The trial court denied the
motion for fees and the appeal was taken. Because the plaintiff had voluntarily
dismissed, the appellate court ruled the voluntary dismissal terminated the trial
court's jurisdiction thereby removing jurisdiction from the court for further
proceedings.
The prior Florida cases cited in Schere for the proposition that a specific
remand for appellate attorneys' fees is required are likewise different than this
appeal. In Homsby v. Newman, 444 So.2d 90 (FL 3d DCA 1984), the trial court
made an award of attorneys' fees in connection with a custody action on a claim
for allowance of temporary attorneys' fees. The court reversed the award of
temporary attorneys' fees because it impermissibly compensated Appellee's
counsel for services rendered during prior appeals. The Court stated:
Absent a remand from an Appellate Court, a
trial court lacks authority to award appellate
attorneys' fees. Furthermore, there is
another, perhaps even more glaring
deficiency in the record. An
Appellee/mother failed to establish her need
for, and the father's ability to pay a
reasonable attorneys' fee... (Citations
omitted.)
444So.2d90at91.
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In Ellswick v.Martinez, 394 So.2d 529 (Fl. 3d DCA 1981), the Court
addressed an appeal of orders awarding child support, expert witness fees, travel
expenses and costs incident to a birth in a contested paternity case. The award of
attorneys' fees was affirmed with the exception of the portions expressly attributed
to legal services on the prior appeal. The prior appeal, Ellswick v. Martinez, 341
So.2d 1095 (Fl. 3d DCA 1976), involved a one-word opinion "affirmed."
The Florida cases involve unique Florida procedures. Rule 9.400 Florida
Rules Appellate Procedure provides a motion for attorneys' fees to be served not
later than the time for service of the Reply Brief and shall state the grounds upon
which relief is sought. The assessment of attorneys' fees may be remanded to the
lower tribunal. If attorneys' fees are assessed by the court, the lower tribunal may
enforce payment.
In three of the cases cited by Anderson, the trial court acted on attorneys'
fees on appeal after the issue had been specifically rejected. (Beus, Slattery and TS
1 Partnership). In Vinton Eppson there was no remand to the trial court. In Yorke
Management and Schere, Massachusetts and Florida had unique procedures for
appellate attorneys' fees not applicable to this case. In this appeal, the cases cited
by Anderson do not support her position that the trial court acted in opposition to
the mandate of this Court. Rather, in this case, Thompson meets the requirements
for recovery of attorneys' fees on appeal.
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POINT III
THE MANDATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT
APPLY TO CIRCUMSTANCES IN
WHICH APPLICATION OF THE RULE IS
ERRONEOUS.
The mandate doctrine is a law of the case doctrine providing that matters
adjudicated by an appellate court are final and not subject to further trial court
action. The mandate doctrine did not preclude the Third District Court from
awarding Thompson his attorneys' fees on appeal.
As set forth in this Brief, the trial court acted within the scope of the remand
in addressing appellate attorneys' fees for Thompson. There was a remand for
attorneys' fees without limitation as to the trial court or appellate court levels.
Assuming arguendo that the Court did not make a remand to the Third District
Court specific enough to allow consideration of appellate attorneys' fees,
exceptions to the mandate rule apply to allow a trial court to consider the
attorneys' fees on appeal. In Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Ut. 60,
191 P.2d 153 (Ut. 1948), the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether on remand
the District Court could consider amended pleadings and different issues than
existed prior to the remand. The Court stated:
The principles boil down to this fundamental
proposition: As to all matters adjudicated by
the appellate court, both the trial court and
the parties are foreclosed from further trying
those matters. They become the law of the
19

case. But as to matters left open by the
appellate court, it is within the sound
discretion of the trial court to permit
amended or supplemental proceedings as to
those matters.
191 P.2d 153 @ 158.
This Court instructed the Third District Court to "determine if an award of
costs and attorneys' fees should be awarded the husband and, if so, to determine
the amount." (R. @ 536). This Court did not deny attorneys' fees to Thompson.
Consequently, the remand to the District Court for consideration of attorneys' fees
involves at least a matter left open by this Court.
In Gilden v. Guardian Title, 31 P.3d 543, 438 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21 (Ut. 2001),
the Court addressed the implications of the mandate doctrine. The Court noted that
the mandate doctrine is not applied inflexibly. The Court stated:
... Indeed, this court need not apply the
doctrine to promote efficiency at the
expense of the greater interest in preventing
unjust results or unwise precedent.
Accordingly, the doctrine will generally not
be enforced under the following exceptional
circumstances:
(1) When there has been an intervening
change of controlling authority;
(2) When new evidence has become
available; or
(3) When the court is convinced that its prior
decision is clearly erroneous and would
work a manifest injustice.
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In this case, assuming that the Appeals Court did not remand for a
determination of Thompson's appellate attorneys' fees, the third exception to the
mandate rule applies. Thompson met all of the requirements to be awarded
appellate fees. To deny Thompson the appellate fees would be clearly erroneous
and would work a manifest injustice. The manifest injustice being that Thompson
would be denied the fees he is entitled to because no specific reference to appellate
fees was made in the remand of this Court. The award of attorneys' fees at the trial
court and appellate court level for Anderson in the first appeal while denying
appellate fees to Thompson on a similar basis points out the injustice of
Anderson's position.
In Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 (Ut. 1990), the Utah Supreme Court
discussed the rationale of the law of the case doctrine. The doctrine protects the
decisions already made in a case. Specifically, the Court stated:
... The law of the case doctrine generally
provides that a decision on an issue at one
stage of a case is binding in successive
stages of the same litigation. However, this
doctrine does not prevent a judge from
reconsidering his or her previous non-final
orders. As Justice Holmes once noted, the
law of the case doctrine "merely expresses
the practice of courts generally to refuse to
reopen what has been decided, not a limit to
their power.".. (Citations omitted).
809 P.2d 734 @ 739-740.
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The issue of Thompson's appellate attorneys' fees was not decided by the
District Court or the Court of Appeals prior to the appeal. There was no prior
decision that was being revisited by the trial court in opposition to the decision of
this Court. The District Court properly acted within its power. The Third District
Court's award of attorneys' fees is consistent with the Court of Appeals remand
and applicable law.
POINT IV
IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
AWARDING THOMPSON'S
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
WITHOUT A SPECIFIC REMAND, THIS
ERROR WAS A HARMLESS ERROR.
The law applicable to appellate attorneys' fees is not in dispute. Thompson
is entitled to fees on appeal if Thompson was entitled to fees at the trial court level.
The trial court found Thompson to be entitled to these fees. Anderson does not
argue that Thompson did not prevail at the trial court or on appeal. Rather,
Anderson argues that this Court's failure to specifically identify appeal fees and
costs leads to a result that those fees and costs are not recoverable.
At the oral argument held June 17, 2009, Anderson's counsel argued the
following regarding the basis for denying Thompson his attorneys' fees:
".. .Husband argues that with a reversal he
should be awarded his attorney fees and
costs below," and we're not going to dispute
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that. But it doesn't say anything about his
attorney fees for appeal two.
And they're saying in the affidavit
Mr. Richards providing in February, had a
total of the pre-appeal fees of $3,900 $3,902.50 and then had his appeal two fees
in addition which I don't think, well, don't
think - the court didn't say that they would
be entitled to that.
Now, I understand the argument,
what's good for the goose is good for the
gander. Get it. Because in appeal one the
Court of Appeals did outline that and so I
understand it. If the Court looks and it says,
Well, since the Court of Appeals said the
lower court could look at an award of
attorney fees for the appeal, why can't we
do it here in appeal two? And I'll be the
first to admit that it's an interesting
argument, but they did not specifically set
that forth.
(R. @ 417 Pgs. 6-7, Appellee Addendum 4.)
Anderson argues for a result acknowledged to occur only by a hyper-critical
reading of this Court's remand and a result inconsistent with applicable law.
The Utah Supreme Court in Glew v. Ohio Savings Bank, 598 Ut. Adv. Rep.
47, 2008 Utah 17 (Ut. 2008), considered a petition for rehearing for an award of
fees on appeal. The petition followed a successful defense of an appeal reported in
Glew v. Ohio Savings Bank, 288 P.3d 791, 582 Ut. Adv. Rep. 27 (2007). The
Supreme Court while noting that a motion brought under Rule 23, Utah Rules of
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Appellate Procedure would be the basis for applying for an award of attorneys'
fees on appeal, stated:
The availability of fees on appeal is,
however, an issue that is in almost all
instances, ancillary to the issues to which the
parties have devoted their energies and
precious brief pages. This issue is never an
issue on appeal that can be expected to
appear in a docketing statement under the
requirements of Rule 9(c)(7) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure...
The Supreme Court reiterated the "settled view" that a party who received
an award of attorneys' fees below is entitled to their fees on appeal granting the
application for attorneys' fees. In Glew, the Supreme Court did not address
attorneys' fees in its holding. The error was corrected by entering an order
allowing fees. In this case, Respondent's right to attorneys' fees and costs was
remanded to the Third District Court.
In Glew, the Court utilized the motion as a means to correct the error. In
this case, either no error occurred and the case was remanded for a determination
of all attorneys' fees both at the trial and appellate levels or this Court erred by not
setting forth a specific remand for appellate fees. This error can be corrected by
this Court by affirming the District Court's award of attorneys' fees.
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POINT V
APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO HIS
ATTORNEYS'FEES ON APPEAL.
Thompson's basis for recovery of attorneys' fees is statutory. Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-3(2) provides for attorneys' fees in this action. Thompson submits that
the Third District Court's Order should be affirmed. An affirmance makes
Thompson the prevailing party in this appeal. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the Third District Court for a determination of an award of attorneys'
fees to Thompson on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Order of the Third District Court awarding Thompson attorneys' fees on
appeal should be affirmed. This case should be remanded to the Third District
Court for an award of attorneys' fees incurred on appeal to Thompson.
DATED this 2 ^ _ day of May, 2010.
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES

Bruce L. Richards
Attorney for Appellee
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Minute Entry
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IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA LAREE ANDERSON, fka
LINDA LAREE THOMPSON,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 994300102

Petitioner,
vs.
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON,
Respondent.

The Court of Appeals remanded this matter

for consideration of

attorney's fees claims twice: on petitioner's claim for fees after the
decision on appeal, January 4, 2008, m

favor of the petitioner; and

after the decision on appeal, May 15, 2008, in favor of the respondent.
An evidentiary hearing was held February 9, 2009, to consider both
of these matters.

Petitioner was present and represented by David J.

Friel, and respondent was present and represented by Bruce L. Richards.
The parties testified, the Court received exhibits, and now makes this
ruling.
On

the first

remand,

this

Court was directed

standard criteria for award of fees:

to consider the

(1) requesting party in need of

assistance; (2) fees reasonableness; and (3) responding party's ability
to pay.

The respondent stipulated that he has the ability to pay.

The evidence showed petitioner has gross monthly income of $728,
plus $2,061 in monthly child support, plus an annual child support
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payment

earmarked for Christmas and birthday gifts in the amount of

$2,200.

Her income has been static for the past eight years.

approximately 25 hours per week in a daycare facility.

She works

She previously

cut and colored women's hair in a salon in her home, but does that only
once or twice a year at the present time.

She has remarried as of 2004,

has an additional child, and her spouse earns $13.50 per hour working
full-time.

Petitioner testified that she can't afford her attorney's

fees and needs help.

The total family income at the present time is

approximately $3,138 per month gross.

Petitioner's family has a marital

home, two vehicles which are paid for, and claims total monthly living
expenses of $4,982, with expenses exceeding income in a relatively small
amount.

Attorney fees were not included in said monthly expenses.

Petitioner's counsel's Affidavit indicates that he bills his time
at $200 per hour and bills his office staff at $40 per hour, and that on
the first appeal billed petitioner $9,605.20.

The Court finds that

petitioner's hourly rate is toward the top end of hourly rates for
domestic work in Tooele County, but is not unreasonable, but finds that
billing out office staff time at $40 per hour is neither reasonable nor
ethical.

Mr. Friel stated that his staff is not paid the $40 per hour

unless the client pays, so his staff has exactly the same interest in the
firm's accounts receivable as he does.

A review of the time spent on the

appeal does not indicate that increments of time expended on specific
aspects of the appeal were

unreasonable.
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Respondent objects to both the hourly rate and the time expended on
the basis that counsel for respondent bills at $175 per hour and spent^
less time on the appeal than did counsel for petitioner.

The Court finds

that the time and hourly rates of Mr. Friel are reasonable and that the
petitioner

should be awarded

fees in that

amount,

specifically

not

including any amounts billed for staff from Mr. Friel7s office.
The first appeal was simply regarding the ruling after trial.
second appeal was different.
holding

him in contempt.

Respondent

The Appeals

The

appealed the Court's Order

Court

reversed

and

remanded,

specifically stating:
Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-3(2), provides that, "In any action to
enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court
may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the
party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense."
Accordingly, we remand to the District Court to determine if
an award of costs and attorney fees should be awarded the
husband and, if so, to determine the amount.
Respondent clearly prevailed on appeal.

Since the Appeals Court

relied on the enforcement provision of the statute, it does not appear
that this Court needs to use the same analysis as used on the first
remand, that of need and ability to pay, but should of course consider
reasonableness.

A

review of Mr. Richards' Affidavit

regarding

the

attorney fees and costs expended on appeal shows that both the hourly
rate and the time increments for the tasks performed were necessary and
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reasonable, and therefore respondent is awarded attorney's fees m
amount set forth m
Mr

the

said Affidavit.

Richards shall prepare Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment

consistent with this Minute Entry
Dated this

(H

day of March, 2 009

/f^
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.*/
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TflATLlTSG CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this ^

day of March, 2009:

David J. Friel
Attorney for Petitioner
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive #225
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Bruce L. Richards, Esq.
Dean A. Stuart, EscJ.
18 05 S. Redwood Road
P.O. Box 25786
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125-0786
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ADDENDUM 2
Thompson's Brief of Appellant
In Appellate Case 20070514
Statement of Issues
And
Point VII
And
Conclusion

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA ANDERSON,
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson),

)
)

Petitioner,
v.

]
)
]

GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON,

;

Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 20070514

]

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH
JUDGE MARK S. KOURIS

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

David J. Friel
Attorney for Petitioner
f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson
2875 South Decker Lake Dr. #225
Salt Lake City, UT 84119
Telephone: (801) 975-8611

Bruce L. Richards
Dean A. Stuart
Bruce L. Richards and Associates
Attorneys for Respondent
1805 South Redwood Road
P.O. Box 25786
Salt Lake City, UT 84125-0786
Telephone (801) 972-0307

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

ISSUE 4: Did the district Court err in not awarding Respondent his attorney's
fees?
ISSUE PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the award of attorneys' fees for
the Respondent was raised at the evidentiary hearing. Specific objection to the attorneys'
fee award took place at the end of the evidentiary hearing. (R@416 P. 78-79).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The interpretation of a divorce decree is reviewed
for correctness, affording the District Court no deference. Hawkins v. Peart, 2000 Utah
94, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §78-32-1
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are
contempts of the authority of the Court:
(1)

Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while

holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial
proceeding.
(2)

Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to

interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.
(3)

Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an

attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to perform a judicial
or ministerial service.
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non-compliance with reducing the child support amount. Respondent made his January
2007 of 2,500 plus..." (R@396-297).
Inexplicably the Court made Finding of Fact Number 7 that states:
Regarding the issue of refunding $455.08 from
Petitioner to Respondent concerning the
difference in the January child support payment
is ruled in favor of Petitioner. Therefore,
Petitioner has no need to refund those monies.
(R@395 % 7.)
An extended discussion involving the Court and Petitioner's counsel took place during
the evidentiary hearing regarding the adjustment to the child support. The Court reviewed
Exhibit 7, a letter from Petitioner's counsel to Respondent's counsel. The letter stated that an
adjustment to the child support could be made based on information provided by the Respondent.
Should a different conclusion result based upon subsequently prepared tax returns, a separate
adjustment would be required. The Court concluded Respondent had paid the correct amount.
(R@146 Pgs. 41-43).
There is no factual basis for ruling in favor of Petitioner regarding the difference in child
support. Respondent overpaid the child support and should recover this excess.
POINT VII
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
OF CONTEMPT OR ON ANY STATUTORY
BASIS.
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-2 provides for a discretionary award of attorney's fees in
an action to enforce a divorce action. Specifically, this statute states:
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In any action to enforce an order of
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or
division of property in a domestic case, the
court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially
prevailed upon the claim or defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) (Supp. 2005).
The Decree of Divorce has a provision related to attorney fees. This provision
provides that attorney's fees are awarded if the Court finds a party in contempt of court.
Specifically, Paragraph 34 of the Decree of Divorce states:
If any party should be found to be in
contempt of any provisions of any Order of this
Court, that party shall be responsible for paying
reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the
enforcement thereof. (Appendix C, R@46).
Here, Petitioner brought this Order to Show Cause primarily to recover more child
support. This conclusion is bolstered by the claims of the Petitioner in the Order to Show
Cause that Respondent had failed to pay the proper amount, Petitioner's Affidavit that
she wanted the Court to Order more child support to be paid, the lack of any prior effort
by the Petitioner to arrange different payment methods for payment of child support and
the lack of any damages by the asserted misconduct of Respondent. The Respondent
successfully defended against these allegations and consequently should recover
attorney's fees.
As set forth throughout this Brief, Respondent should not be held in contempt of
Court. The basis for the award of fees does not exist.
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Assuming arguendo that Respondent was in contempt of Court, Petitioner is not
entitled to an award of all her attorney's fees. The fees must be allocated to the issues on
which Petitioner prevailed.
Respondent is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party. Even
if Petitioner were found to have prevailed on some issues, Respondent is entitled to
recover his fees for the issues Respondent prevailed on. This includes the child support
issue. Respondent is also entitled to this attorney's fees and costs of appeal.
CONCLUSION
Respondent requests that this Court reverse Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Order
from Hearing Held April 16, 2007. Respondent should recover the excess $455.08 in
child support paid in January 2007. Respondent should recover his attorney's fees and
costs. For purposes of determining Respondent's attorney's fees and costs, the case
should be remanded to the District Court.
Dated this j/j> % day of November, 2007.
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES

ML
Bruce L. Richards
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM 3
Thompson's Reply Brief of Appellant
Point V
And
Conclusion

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA ANDERSON,
(f.k.a Linda LaRee Thompson),
Petitioner,

;
]
]
)

Appellate Case No 20070176

v.
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON,
Respondent.

]
]

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH
JUDGE MARK S. KOURIS

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

-David-Jr-FrielAttorney for Petitioner
f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson
2875 South Decker Lake Dr. #225
Salt Lake City, UT 84119
Telephone: (801) 975-8611

Bruce-L. -RichardsDean A. Stuart
Bruce L. Richards and Associates
Attorneys for Respondent
1805 South Redwood Road
P.O. Box 25786
Salt Lake City, UT 84125-0786
Telephone (801) 972-0307

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

ambiguity as to what Paragraph 3 means. The District Court, however, did not rule, as a matter
of law, that Paragraph 3 was ambiguous.
POINT V
THIS COURT, IN THE FIRST APPEAL OF THIS
MATTER, ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES. FEES MUST
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE
ANK §30-3-3. FINDINGS MEETING THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE MUST BE
MADE.
In Anderson v. Thompson, 594 U. Adv. Rep. 3, the Court addressed attorney's fees in
circumstances where the Court found Appellant owed additional child support and other amounts
and was in contempt of court. This Court ruled that the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3
must be met in order for attorney's fees to be awarded and that the District Court had not made
the necessary findings. This Court stated:
Under Utah Code section 30-3-3, a trial court "may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney's fees, and
witness fees . of the other party to enable the other
party to prosecute or defend the action." "In doing
so, however, the trial court must base its award of
attorney' s-fees- '-on evidence-of-the-receiving
spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees" further, ccthe decision to award attorney's
fees" must be based on sufficient findings regarding
these factors." (Citations omitted.)
Anderson v. Thompson, 594 U. Adv. Rep. 3, @ par. 40 (Ut Ct. App 2008).
The District Court in this proceeding did not apply Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. The
District Court did not make the findings required by Anderson v. Thompson. The District court
further refused to award fees to Appellant or reduce Appellee's fees based on the Appellant
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prevailing on the significant issue in this proceeding. This issue was Appellee's claim that
Appellant owed more child support in January, February and March, 2007.
The District Court's refusal to award fees to Appellant or reduce Appellee's fees is
specifically addressed by Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. The requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-33(2) apply to this proceeding. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provides:
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parenttime, child support, alimony, or division of property
in a domestic case, the court may award costs and
attorney's fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against the party if the court finds the
party is impecunious or enters in the record the
reasons for not awarding fees.
In this case, the trial court did not apply this statute. The Court did not consider that the
Appellant was the prevailing party on the claim that the Appellant had not paid the correct child
support for January, February and March, 2007. The Appellant, the prevailing party, should
have been able awarded his costs attorney's fees with respect to the issue of child support. This
fee award would apply unless the District Court found the Appellee impecunious or entered
reasons for not awarding fees.
POINT VI
THE REQUIRED FACTS FOR DECIDING THIS
APPEAL HAVE BEEN PRESENTED.
Appellee argues that how the appeal should be dismissed because the facts were not
marshaled. (Brief of Appellee Argument: Point Two.) Appellee argues that a Finding of Fact is
. being challenged and all record evidence supporting the finding has not been marshaled. See
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(9).
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The issues in this appeal involve errors of law by the District Court and the Findings of
the District Court that do not meet the requirements of law. The issues in this appeal are matters
of law. The issues of law are the constitutional requirement that a party be afforded due process
in a contempt proceeding; the statutory requirement that an Order of the Court be violated; the
making of Findings of Fact meeting the three requirements for contempt; finding that the
required Findings were found by clear and convincing evidence; and complying with Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-3 regarding attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is entitled to reversal of the District Court decision. There is no violation of an
Order of Court meeting the constitutional, statutory and judicial requirements for a finding of
contempt. There has been no finding by clear and convincing evidence of any violation of a
legally sufficient Court Order. Attorney's fees should have been awarded to the Appellant. This
case should be remanded for an award of the Appellant's attorney's fees including fees on
appeal.
Dated this 25th day of February, 2008.
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES

-rv^^^^Ha^
Bruce L. Richards
"/
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM 4
Transcript of Oral Argument
June 17, 2009
Pages 6 and 7

1

February hearing and in your minute entry ruling, found not

2

only that we should be awarded the reasonable attorney fees

3

because of the needs-based analysis that Your Honor did, but

4

Your Honor then specifically awarded our attorney fees for

5

the appeal.

6

And the difference was the Court of Appeals gave

7

this Court direction to do that.

So in appeal one it said,

8

we remand, or under appeal one was only remanded for attorney

9

fees.

Everything else stood on the contempts and all others.

10

And then it said with the Judge Kouris ruling, since he

11

didn't do the needs-based and reasonableness, it was

12

remanded.

13

direction and said, if the court finds that there was need

14

and does that analysis, then it can enter the attorney fees

15

and specifically the court said, and the court can then

16

address the attorney fees for appeal number one.

17

they're not disputing that.

18

So then the Court of Appeals gave this Court

And so

And the only reason I bring it up is in appeal

19

number two and that page number 5 specifically then, Your

20

Honor, I'm looking at Line 3 again, backing up just a little

21

bit, it's says, "likewise, there is no basis to grant wife's

22

request for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.

23

Husband argues that with a reversal he should be awarded his

24

attorney fees and costs below," and we're not going to

25

dispute that.

But it doesn't say anything abo'ut his attorney

1

fees for appeal two.

2

And they're saying in the affidavit Mr. Richards

3

providing in February, had a total of the pre-appeal fees of

4

$3,900 - $3,902.50 and then had his appeal two fees in

5

addition which I don't think, well, don't think - the court

6

didn't say that they would be entitled to that.

7 I

Now, I understand the argument, what's good for the
goose is good for the gander.

Get it.

Because in appeal one

9 I the Court of Appeals did outline that and so I understand it.
10

If the Court looks and it says, Well, since the Court of

11

Appeals said the lower court could look at an award of

12

attorney fees for the appeal, why can't we do it here in

13

appeal two?

14

interesting argument, but they did not specifically set that

15

forth.

And I'll be the first to admit that it's an

16

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Friel.

17

MR. FRIEL: Thank you.

18

MR. RICHARDS: Mr. Richards appearing on behalf of

19 J the respondent.
20

Your Honor, as I've calculated through and as I

21

indicated we, we by and large had no particular issues or

22

problems.

23

$51,964.58 in favor of the petitioner.

24

amounts that were ordered by the Court plus the attorneys

25

fees of $7,652.97,

It appears that the Court has approved a total of
That includes the

7

